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ESSAY
THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN A JUSTICE REHNQUIST
WORLD
Eric John Segall*
It is quite possible, at least in the philosophic sense, to believe thoroughly
in the right of free speech, but to have a good deal of doubt about its
usefulness.
William H. Rehnquist'
In February, 1997, a mysterious and fatal virus strikes four Su-
preme Court Justices. President Gingrich quickly nominates
replacements to fill the unexpected vacancies. During their confir-
mation hearings, all four testify that they share Justice Rehnquist's
views on the First Amendment. After the Senate confirms them, the
four new Justices, along with Justice Rehnquist, begin aggressively
rewriting first amendment law. The following is what the First
Amendment might look like in this new Justice Rehnquist world.'
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State College of Law. I would like to thank Arnold
Loewy, Paul Milich, John Malcolm, Ellen Podgor, Mary Radford, and Steve Wermiel for their
helpful contributions to this Essay.
1. Civility and Freedom of Speech, 49 Ind. L.J. 1, 2 (1973).
2. Some of the cases discussed in this Essay are imaginary and some are real. All of the imagi-
nary decisions are, however, based on actual opinions Chief Justice Rehnquist has written or votes
he has cast. Despite the tone of this Essay, I am not suggesting that all of these decisions are
unreasonable interpretations of the First Amendment, although many are. Moreover, to be fair,
Justice Rehnquist has, on occasion, ruled in favor of those asserting First Amendment rights. See,
e.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1990) (writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Rehnquist held that state bars cannot use mandatory dues for political causes unrelated to regu-
lating the legal profession); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1988) (writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist held that a public figure could not recover for intentional
infliction of emotional distress arising out of magazine parody without establishing malice as re-
quired by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907 (1982) (Rehnquist, J. concurring) (holding boycotts are constitutionally
protected under the first amendment). Nevertheless, as this Essay demonstrates, Justice Rehnquist
has a uniquely (for a Supreme Court Justice) limited view of first amendment protections. See,
e.g., infra notes 8, 11, 16, 22 (citing examples of Justice Rehnquist taking positions on first
amendment issues not shared by anyone else on the Court).
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THREE YEARS LATER
It is a cold December day in London, England. Sir Andrew Blake
is a noted British law professor and civil rights advocate who prefers
the free speech protections of the United States Constitution to
England's common law legal system. Three years ago, Sir Andrew
suffered a serious stroke after he began a book comparing the En-
glish and American notions of freedom of speech, freedom of the
press, and freedom of religion. He is finally ready to complete the
project, but upon returning to work, discovers an astonishing First
Amendment development in the United States. It appears that two
similarly situated political protesters were recently given quite dif-
ferent treatment by the United States Supreme Court. One political
protester, upset about the Gingrich Administration's foreign policy,
was arrested for burning the American flag during a peaceful dem-
onstration. He was prosecuted pursuant to a state law prohibiting
flag burning if the burner's intent is to cause offense to others.' The
Supreme Court upheld his conviction on the basis that "one of the
high purposes of a democratic society is to legislate against conduct
that is regarded as evil and profoundly offensive to the majority of
people - whether it be murder, embezzlement, pollution, or flag
burning.""
On the same day that the flag burner was arrested, another politi-
cal protester, upset about his state's affirmative action policies, was
arrested for burning a cross directly in front of several people of
color. He was prosecuted under a state law that prohibits the use of
symbols that "one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender." 5 The state supreme court interpreted this
hate speech law to apply to only those symbols that amounted to
"fighting words," which "by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." 6 The United
3. This statute is similar to the Texas law struck down in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989), which prohibited the "desecration" of the American flag in a way that "the actor knows
will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action." Id. at 401 n.l.
4. See Texas v. Palmer, 646 U.S. 112 (1997) (quoting Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 435).
5. This statute is identical to the law struck down by the Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia's opinion). The defend-
ant in RAY. burned a cross on a black family's lawn. Id. at 2541.
6. See Seaver v. Allstate, 432 All Rept. 2d. 234, 236 (1997) (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
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States Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction on the
basis that the hate speech law, even as narrowly construed by the
state supreme court, violated the First Amendment. Sir Andrew
quickly surmises that these two cases mean that states can legally
outlaw the burning of an American flag in political protest, but they
cannot prohibit the burning of a cross to demonstrate racial hatred.,
In light of this development, Sir Andrew decides that in order to
complete his book he ought to visit the United States to observe first
hand what has occurred since he suffered his stroke three years ago.
Day I
Upon disembarking his jumbo jet at Allstate International Air-
port and walking through the crowded terminal to baggage claim,
Sir Andrew notices that there are no political, religious or social
groups distributing information in the Airport. Sir Andrew had
heard that such groups frequently target American transportation
centers, and he is somewhat surprised by this lack of activity in a
busy airport. While waiting for his luggage, he opens his summary
of Supreme Court cases and sees that the Supreme Court has held
that airports are not public fora because they have not for "time out
of mind been held in the public trust and used for the purposes of
expressive activity." 9 Therefore, the Supreme Court subsequently
held that even complete bans on the sale and distribution of litera-
7. See Fingers v. Allstate, 631 U.S. 123 (1997). Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
relied on the Court's prior R.A.V. decision. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541. In that decision, the
Court held that if a state is going to prohibit fighting words, it must prohibit all fighting words
and not a subset of fighting words involving race, color, creed, religion or gender. Id. at 2449-50.
For a discussion comparing this holding to the holding in Texas v. Johnson, see infra note 8.
8. Justice Rehnquist is the only member of the Court who both voted to uphold the flag burn-
ing law and strike down the hate speech law on the specific basis that a state cannot prohibit race-
based fighting words. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 421 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); R.A.V., 112 S. Ct.
at 2541. The other three Justices who would have upheld the flag burning law, Justices White,
Stevens, and O'Connor, would have also upheld the Minnesota hate speech law at issue in R.A.V.
had it truly been limited to race-based fighting words likely to cause an immediate breach of the
peace. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550-60. They found, however, that the Minnesota Supreme
Court had not really limited the statute to apply only to fighting words. Id. These three Justices,
therefore, believe that states can prohibit both racially-based fighting words and the burning of
the American flag with the intent to offend others. Therefore, although Justices White, O'Connor,
and Stevens may have somewhat narrow views about the first amendment, they are nonetheless
consistent. Justice Rehnquist, however, is the only member of the Court who believes that states
can prohibit flag burning as a means of political protest, but cannot prohibit race-based fighting
words. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 421 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549-50.
9. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2706 (1992)
(Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority).
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ture in airports do not violate the First Amendment.10 Sir Andrew
concludes that Allstate has probably enacted such a total ban.
After Sir Andrew collects his suitcase, he takes a taxi to his hotel,
checks in, and decides to take a walk. His hotel is near Allstate
Central Park and because it is such a beautiful warm day, he de-
cides to buy a newspaper and read it in the park. He finds several
newsracks and notices that the price of one newspaper, The Allstate
Times, is fifty cents while the price of the other newspaper, The
Local Gazette, is only thirty-five cents. Surprised by this discrep-
ancy, he asks a passerby what accounts for the difference in price.
Luckily the passerby, a member of the Allstate legislature, is
equipped with the answer.
"Last year we passed a law that places a use tax on newsprint
and ink but we exclude the first one hundred thousand dollars of ink
and paper from any taxation. That means that only large newspa-
pers have to pay the use tax."' 1
"Doesn't your First Amendment prohibit a tax on large newspa-
pers but not small newspapers?" Sir Andrew asks.
"No sir, that used to be the law but the Supreme Court recently
changed its view and held that a tax on only certain members of the
press does not violate the First Amendment unless it is a 'deliberate
and calculated device designed with an illicit purpose." 2 Of course,
we argued that we wanted to raise revenue without hurting the little
guy. We didn't tax that rag the Allstate Times for any illicit pur-
pose, at least not that the Times could prove in court."
Sir Andrew thanks the legislator for his time and information.
The legislator responds by handing Sir Andrew his business card
and encouraging him to call if he has any more questions during his
stay in Allstate.
10. See ACLU v. Kennedy Airport, 629 U.S. 421 (1998) (relying on Justice Rehnquist's dis-
senting opinion in Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2709, 2710 (1992)). In
Lee, the Supreme Court invalidated a total ban on leafletting at Kennedy, La Guardia, and New-
ark Airports. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2709.
11. An identical law was struck down by the Supreme Court in Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 593 (1983). Justice Rehnquist was the sole dissenter to the
holding that the exemption violated the first amendment because it treated large newspapers dif-
ferently than small newspapers. Id. at 596 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Even Justice White, who
consistently voted against special protections for the press under the first amendment, see, e.g.,
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369 (1974) (White, J., dissenting); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972), believed the tax scheme to be unconstitutional. Minneapolis
Star, 460 U.S. at 593 (White, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
12. See New York Times v. Alabama, 639 U.S. 217 (1999) (citing Justice Rehnquist's dissent
in Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 603).
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Sir Andrew purchases the Local Gazette and sits down on a park
bench. While he is reading the paper, he notices an interesting story
on page thirty-two. It appears that the new military leaders of the
country of Tyranny have nationalized the country's newspapers and
clamped down on all political dissent. In addition, according to the
story, Tyranny just happens to have an embassy in Allstate. Because
Sir Andrew believes in freedom of speech at all times and in all
cultures, he decides to stage a one-person protest in front of Tyr-
anny's embassy. He visits a stationary store and draws a large sign
stating "Down with Tyranny! Allow Private Newspapers and the
Freedom to Dissent." Pleased with his pun, he ascertains the loca-
tion of the embassy and heads there feeling quite good about him-
self. "Nothing like a good political protest to make one's day," he
always says.
When he arrives at the embassy, he stands on the sidewalk about
300 feet from the front door and holds up his sign. Five minutes
later, however, a policeman approaches Sir Andrew and informs
him that he is breaking a law prohibiting the display of any sign
within 500 feet of an embassy that tends to bring the government
occupying that embassy into "public odium or disrepute." 13 Sir An-
drew says to the officer, "You mean I'm not allowed to protest in
front of the embassy?" The policeman responds that such protests
are illegal under the Allstate Embassy Protection Act and that he
happens to know the Supreme Court recently upheld the law.14 He
also tells Sir Andrew that, because he is obviously a foreigner, he
will cut him some slack and not arrest him if he agrees to leave the
embassy immediately. Sir Andrew is tempted to fight on but decides
that he will not be able to continue his First Amendment tour of the
United States if he is sitting in jail or deported back to England.
Accordingly, he agrees to leave the embassy and returns to his hotel
to reconsider the events of his first day in the United States.
Day H
Having slept rather soundly through the night, Sir Andrew orders
a room service breakfast and turns on the television to watch the
13. This law is identical to the law struck down by the Supreme Court in Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 315, 329 (1988).
14. See Gulf War Veteran Soc'y v. Allstate, 644 U.S. 167 (1999) (relying on Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent in Boos, 485 U.S. at 338). Justice Rehnquist relied on Judge Bork's decision in the
court of appeals. Boos, 485 U.S. at 338.
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local news. After several uninteresting stories, he hears an item that
takes his attention away from his breakfast. The newscaster reports
that at 10:00 a.m. this morning the trial of a young man who was
arrested for breach of the peace is scheduled to begin in the Allstate
courthouse. What makes the trial noteworthy, according to the new-
scaster, is that the defendant was arrested for creating a disturbance
while advocating that Jewish-Americans be deported to Israel. The
main issue in the case is whether the protester was entitled to keep
speaking after a police officer ordered him to stop for fear that the
crowd would attack the speaker and cause a riot.15 After hearing
about the trial, Sir Andrew decides that he will begin his day by
visiting the courthouse to observe how this fascinating First Amend-
ment case will unfold.
Sir Andrew arrives at the courthouse at 9:15 a.m. to make sure
that he can obtain a seat in the courtroom. Upon arriving there,
however, he is told that at 8:00 that morning the judge granted the
joint request of the defendant and the prosecutor to close the trial to
the public. Sir Andrew asks the clerk how this can be and she re-
sponds that he might want to talk to the legal reporter for the All-
state Times who was in the courtroom when the judge issued her
closure order. Sir Andrew calls the newspaper and asks to talk to
the legal reporter. When she comes on the line, Sir Andrew explains
who he is and asks about the reasons for and legality of the judge's
closure order. The reporter explains that the government wanted the
courtroom closed for fear that a courtroom disturbance would cause
a mistrial, and the defendant wanted the courtroom closed because
his attorney believed that the jury would be more sympathetic with-
out a large crowd in the courtroom. Sir Andrew replies that the
press and public must have some right to attend a trial of such im-
portant public interest. The reporter sighs, and informs Sir Andrew
that at one time he would have been correct but now if the prosecu-
tor and the defendant agree to close a trial, the judge can order the
trial closed for that reason alone. Moreover, such an order is not
15. A similar issue was raised by Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 316-17 (1951), and has
generated much academic commentary. See, e.g., Note, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1773, 1775 (1967)
(arguing that a hostile audience should not be permitted to suppress a peaceful demonstration by
using acts of violence which necessitate police intervention); Richard Stewart, Public Speech and
Public Order in Britain and the United States, 13 VAND. L. REV. 625, 632-33 (1960) (discussing
Feiner in detail); Walter Gellhorn, AMERICAN RIGHTS: THE CONSTITUTION IN ACTION 55-62
(1960) (discussing the problem that arises, such as in Feiner, when a speaker's words have actu-
ally aroused the hostility of his audience, creating the possible danger of public disorder).
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subject to judicial review, regardless of the press's or the public's
desire to attend the trial.16 Sir Andrew politely thanks the reporter
for her help, hangs up the phone, and heads to the courtroom cafe-
teria for a cup of coffee and a moment of reflection to ponder this
surprising disruption of his planned morning activity.
Frustrated by his exclusion from the trial, Sir Andrew decides to
call his niece who lives in the neighboring town of Robertsonville,
about 40 miles away. She is a teacher in a private Catholic high
school there and suggests that Sir Andrew rent a car and meet her
at the school around 1:00 p.m. After she gives him directions, Sir
Andrew finishes his coffee and returns to his hotel to inquire about
renting a car.
Sir Andrew arrives at the school promptly at 1:00 p.m., and is
greeted by his niece with a warm hug. She asks him if he wants a
tour of the school, and he responds affirmatively. They enter the
school, and Sir Andrew's niece shows him into a room containing
numerous state of the art computer systems designed to assist stu-
dents preparing for college. As they are about to leave the room, Sir
Andrew notices the following plaque to the right of the door:
THIS COMPUTER ROOM WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY A GRANT
FROM THE ROBERTSONVILLE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
Surprised, Sir Andrew says to his niece, "I thought that the
United States Constitution's First Amendment prohibits direct gov-
16. See Wall St. J. v. Allstate Sup. Ct., 655 U.S. 567 (1998) (relying on Justice Rehnquist's
sole dissent in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 604 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)). In that dissent, Justice Rehnquist asked whether there is "any provision in the Con-
stitution" that requires a trial court to open its proceedings to the press and public. Richmond,
448 U.S. at 606 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). His answer was that he was "unable to find any such
prohibition," when both the defendant and the state consent to a closure order. Id. This type of
rhetoric, reading the First Amendment out of the Constitution, is characteristic of Justice Rehn-
quist's First Amendment decisions. See, e.g., Posadas De Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478
U.S. 328, 346 (1986) (upholding a Puerto Rican regulation prohibiting certain kinds of casino
advertising directed at residents of Puerto Rico but not tourists). In Posadas, Justice Rehnquist
wrote, "[iut would ... be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the legislature
the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature the authority to
forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity through advertising..." Id. Justice
Brennan responded in dissent that a doctrine prohibiting the states from restricting speech was not
"strange" at all but "called the First Amendment." Id. at 354-55 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
781 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (writing in a sole dissent that would uphold a state law
prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prices of prescription drugs, a law the Court invalidated
under the first amendment, Justice Rehnquist said, "there is certainly nothing in the United
States Constitution which requires the Virginia legislature to hew to the teachings of Adam Smith
in its legislative decisions regulating the pharmacy profession.").
1995]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ernment support for religious schools."
"Oh no," she responds. "We receive almost all of our secular
books, equipment and materials from the state. In addition, public
school teachers help us out with our secular subjects like math and
science. The state is a big help and without the state aid for our
secular education we would have a much harder time conducting
many of our religious programs.'' 17
After his niece shows him around the school, Sir Andrew asks her
if there are any public schools nearby. He thinks it might be inter-
esting to compare the two schools. She responds that the Robert-
sonville High School is only two miles away and since she has ar-
ranged to take the afternoon off, she can accompany him on his
visit.
They arrive at the school around 2:30 p.m. and head to the princi-
pal's office to ask permission to look around, which the principal
grants. The school is old, dirty, and in much worse condition than
his niece's private school. Sir Andrew suggests that they visit a class
and they enter a classroom at 2:45 to hear the teacher summarizing
the lesson for that class. At 2:55, the teacher says, "As we leave
school today, let us spend a minute in silent prayer and thank the
good Lord for all that he has bestowed upon us." All the students in
the class bow their heads except for two boys in the back of the
room. Sir Andrew remarks to his niece that he thought that teacher-
led prayer was prohibited in American public schools. She whispers
that it used to be but in a recent landmark decision the Supreme
Court held that such prayer was permissible as long as the students
have the choice of not praying with the rest of the class.18
17. This kind of aid to parochial schools was upheld by the Supreme Court in Ollie North
Elementary Sch. v. Missouri, 657 U.S. 432 (1997), in which a majority of the Court embraced
Justice Rehnquist's discussion of the history and purposes of the establishment clause in Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In that dissent, Justice Rehnquist
argued that the establishment clause should be interpreted to "prohibit the establishment of a
national religion, and perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects. [It does not require] the
government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113.
Pursuant to this rationale, secular aid provided to parochial schools, no matter how great the aid
and no matter how much such aid actually furthers the religious mission of the schools, easily
passes constitutional muster. In fact, Justice Rehnquist has consistently voted to approve extensive
aid to parochial schools. See, e.g.. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420-21 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (noting that public school teachers may provide teaching services in parochial school
classrooms) (relying on his dissent in Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
387 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (arguing that equipment and
materials can be constitutionally provided to parochial schools).
18. See Falwell v. Georgia, 634 U.S. 345 (1997) (relying on Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
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As Sir Andrew and his niece leave the school, she invites him to
spend the afternoon with her. Sir Andrew declines, however, be-
cause he has developed a painful migraine headache. He tells his
niece that he needs to return to his hotel to take some medicine that
will hopefully alleviate his discomfort.
As Sir Andrew is driving on the freeway back to his hotel, he
notices that the Allstate license plates carry the slogan, "Choose
Life, not Death, Support the Unborn," in small letters on the bot-
tom of each plate. This surprises him so he picks up the car phone
that came with his rental car and calls the state legislator whom he
met yesterday morning in the park.
"Walter, this is Sir Andrew. Say, I have a question for you. I am
driving on the motorway, and I have noticed that all of the Allstate
cars have license plates supporting one side of your country's abor-
tion debate. Is the slogan mandatory or can someone order a license
plate without the slogan or cover it up?"
"Good to hear from you, Andrew," Walter says, "You know that
slogan created quite a stir because some of our citizens did not want
it on their plates. The law says it is mandatory so the hotheads sued
us. The case went all the way to the Supreme Court but we won.19
Personally, I never saw what the fuss was about."
"Thank you Walter," Sir Andrew says, "hopefully, I won't have
to bother you again." Sir Andrew hangs up the phone and, his head-
ache getting worse, begins concentrating more fully on his driving
and the road back to his hotel. He arrives around 5:00 p.m., orders
a room service dinner, and decides to begin a journal summarizing
his First Amendment adventures in America. Over dinner, Sir An-
drew realizes that his book comparing the two countries needs to be
revised significantly.
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91). In Wallace, Justice Rehnquist said that nothing in the establishment
clause prohibits the state from endorsing prayer in the public schools. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113-
114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678 (1992) (joining
Justice Scalia's dissent arguing that prayer at public school graduation ceremony does not violate
the first amendment).
19. See National Org. for Women v. Allstate, 658 U.S. 324 (1999) (relying on Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 719-22 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
In Wooley, the Court held that New Hampshire violated the first amendment rights of Jehovah's
Witnesses by requiring them (and all other residents of New Hampshire) to have license plates
inscribed with the motto "live free or die." Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717. Justice Rehnquist would
have upheld the New Hampshire law on the grounds that there is no affirmation of belief involved
when a State requires its citizens to carry political messages on their license plates. Id. at 722
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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After dinner, Sir Andrew feels much better and decides to attend
a theatrical production for his evening entertainment. He calls the
concierge and is delighted to learn that a revival of the musical
"Hair," is playing at the Allstate municipal theater. The sixties be-
ing Sir Andrew's favorite decade, he arranges for a ticket and ar-
rives at the theater at 8:00 p.m. The cast is strong, the production
lively, and, of course, toward the end of the show, the nudity is fron-
tal and complete. Sir Andrew leaves the theater his spirits soaring.
As Sir Andrew walks back to his hotel, he decides to take a de-
tour and finds himself in a dark and seedy part of town full of aban-
doned and boarded-up buildings. He quickens his pace, takes a few
turns, and ends up back on the well-lit avenue leading to his hotel.
When he arrives at the lobby, Sir Andrew asks the concierge about
all of the abandoned buildings. The concierge responds that they
used to be strip clubs before Allstate outlawed nude dancing in bars.
Sir Andrew thanks the concierge again for the tickets and retires to
his room.
While performing his evening rituals, Sir Andrew reflects on the
night's events. The play "Hair," with its nude scene, is obviously
allowed by state authorities, but nude night club dancing is not per-
mitted. This seems intuitively inconsistent to Sir Andrew, but it also
rings a bell. He once again consults his summary of Supreme Court
cases, and there he finds what he has been looking for, Barnes v.
Glen Theater, Inc.2 ° In that case, Justice Rehnquist held that a state
could ban nude dancing in bars even though the state's lawyers con-
ceded that the state would permit nude dancing as part of plays and
ballets.2 ' Sir Andrew records the evening's events in his journal and
decides to turn in for the night.
Day III
When he awakes, Sir Andrew decides to take a short walk before
breakfast. Walking along Allstate's streets, he thinks about what he
has seen during his first two days in the United States. Clearly,
there is something very strange going on in a country allegedly com-
mitted to freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom
20. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
21. Id. at 2473 (White, J., dissenting). For one commentator's analysis of Barnes, see Vincent
Blasi, Six Conservatives in Search of the First Amendment: The Revealing Case of Nude Danc-
ing, 33 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 611, 644 (1992) (describing Justice Rehnquist's decision in Barnes
as "ambiguous" and "unelaborated").
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of religion. As he turns a corner, however, he notices an envelope on
the sidewalk. Inside the envelope are ten one hundred dollar bills.
Elated by his find, he heads back to the hotel to have breakfast and
to figure out what to do with the money.
Over his chipped beef on toast, Sir Andrew decides to donate the
money to an American charitable organization. After finishing his
breakfast, he returns to his room and looks up "Charitable Organi-
zations" in the yellow pages. To his great surprise, there are none
listed. Perplexed, he calls the local public library to ascertain how to
find information on charitable groups. A chipper young man an-
swers the phone and Sir Andrew says:
"Hello, I am visiting Allstate from a foreign country and I am
interested in donating some money. Can you provide me some infor-
mation relating to local charities?" The young man pauses and then
responds in a low voice:
"Well, I would like to give you that information, but the sad fact
is that there are no charities operating in Allstate anymore; al-
though that is a situation the legislature is trying to change."
"That cannot be," Sir Andrew immediately replies. He then re-
members the events of the last two days and says, "Permit me to
rephrase that. Why are there no local charities?"
"Well, what happened was that the Allstate legislature decided to
enact all kinds of restrictions on how charitable organizations can
operate and solicit funds. For example, it passed a law prohibiting
the solicitation of contributions by any charitable organization that
spends more than twenty-five percent of its receipts on administra-
tive expenses. 2 It also limited how such organizations can use pro-
fessional fund raisers to help them ask for donations. For example,
such fund raisers have to be licensed by the state, there is a maxi-
mum fee that fund raisers can charge charitable groups, and fund
raisers have to disclose to potential donors significant and obtrusive
information relating to their activities during the previous twelve
months.13 Several charities sued to challenge the laws but my under-
22. A similar law was struck down by the Supreme Court in Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). The Court concluded that the state's interest in preventing
fraud and public annoyance by charitable organizations could be furthered by measures less ex-
treme than the administrative expenses cap. Id. at 637. The Court also stated that "our cases long
have protected speech even though it is in the form of . . .a solicitation to pay or contribute
money." Id. at 633 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). Justice Rehnquist
was the sole dissenter. Id. at 639 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
23. All three restrictions were once struck down by the Supreme Court in Riley v. National
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standing is that the Supreme Court upheld each of the regulations.24
Anyway, because of those laws, local charities decided that they
could not operate effectively in our state. I understand that the leg-
islature may try to rectify the problem but you must be aware of the
difficulties involved in trying to get them to admit they were
wrong."
"Thank you for your help, young man. I hope your legislature
acts quickly." Sir Andrew hangs up the phone and decides that he
will hold on to the money and donate it to his favorite British
charity.
Sir Andrew's agenda for the morning includes an appointment
with a local public broadcasting television station. The station runs
a program called "Crossroads," that is devoted to discussions about
current trends in foreign countries. The host of the show wants to
interview Sir Andrew on the differences between freedom of speech
in America and freedom of speech in England. Sir Andrew arrives
at the station at 10:00 a.m. He is shown to a dressing room where
he is provided a cup of coffee and a list of rules regarding the for-
mat of the show. One of the rules states the following:
This television station receives federal funds pursuant to the Public Televi-
sion Funding Act of 1996. Pursuant to that Act, federal funds cannot be
used to advocate the use of abortion as a method of family planning or the
use of illegal drugs for recreational purposes. Accordingly, please prepare
your remarks consistently with this federal law.
Sir Andrew stares with disbelief at this provision. Although he
had no intention of talking about either topic, he is surprised by this
restriction on what he can say. While he is pondering this problem,
a well-dressed man walks into his dressing room and says:
"Hello, you must be Sir Andrew. My name is Thomas Winston
and I am the host of 'Crossroads.' I see you have read our rules and
regulations. We go on in thirty minutes. Do you have any
questions?"
"I certainly do," responds Sir Andrew. "What is all this about
not advocating abortions or the use of drugs?"
Winston looks at Sir Andrew somewhat pensively and says, "Oh
yes, that. This law was passed several years ago because those idiots
Fed'n of the Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 803 (1988). Justice Rehnquist dissented as to all
three regulations. Id. at 804, 814 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
24. See UNICEF v. Allstate, 656 U.S. 234 (1997) (relying on Justice Rehnquist's dissents in
Schaumburg and Riley).
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in Washington didn't want taxpayer dollars going to fund topics
they thought the public didn't like. They made a big stink over how
the First Amendment might protect such programs, but not when
the programs are aired over stations that receive federal funds. I
think it is a ridiculous rule, but we cannot survive without the fed-
eral money so we have to follow it. So, please take this law into
account during the show or our funding could be withdrawn."
Sir Andrew pauses, sizes up Thomas Winston, and then says,
"Surely this law violates your First Amendment. The United States
government cannot condition its financial grants on the recipients'
promise not to discuss certain topics or express certain viewpoints."
"Well, I'm no lawyer but I do know that the Supreme Court has
upheld this law.2 This is how our lawyers explained this case to me.
The government has no obligation to fund public television. Accord-
ingly, when it does decide to do so, it may put restrictions on the use
of that money. Here, the government decided that taxpayers did not
want their tax dollars spent advocating abortions or illegal drugs.
According to our lawyers, the Supreme Court held that the restric-
tion against such shows simply furthered the purposes of the grant
program and therefore did not violate any constitutional provision,
including the First Amendment. 2 6
Sir Andrew reflects on this answer. In light of the American gov-
ernment's involvement in so-many of the daily affairs of the Ameri-
can people, an interpretation of the First Amendment that allows
the government to tie its largesse to forfeiture of First Amendment
freedoms is an extremely dangerous one. Therefore, being a man of
principle, Sir Andrew decides that he cannot in good conscience
agree to be on the show and, after apologizing to the host, he walks
out of the television station disappointed that he couldn't appear on
the show.
Sir Andrew decides to walk from the studio back to his hotel. On
the way he notices a young man handing out leaflets in the street.
Sir Andrew takes one of the leaflets which says:
A VOTE FOR VICK IS A VOTE AGAINST QUOTAS! ELECT VICK
25. See Firing Line v. United States, 654 U.S. 432 (1997).
26. Justice Rehnquist has used this logic to uphold (or argue to uphold) both content-based and
viewpoint based restrictions on speech in the context of governmental subsidies. See, e.g., Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (upholding HHS regulation prohibiting family planning orga-
nizations that receive federal funds from advocating abortions); FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (dissenting from Court decision invalidating
law prohibiting public television stations from editorializing).
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THOMAS FOR GOVERNOR AND HE WILL HELP YOU GET YOUR
JOB BACK. ISN'T IT ABOUT TIME TO PUT HARD WORKING
REAL AMERICANS BACK TO WORK? ON ELECTION DAY VOTE
FOR VICK! [paid for by Friends for Vick].
Sir Andrew reads the leaflet with some fascination because he has
a-lunch date with an old friend who works for a group dedicated to
furthering minority rights in Allstate. He looks forward to discuss-
ing this leaflet with his friend.
After Sir Andrew returns to his hotel room, he finds a message
from his wife that he needs to return to London immediately. Ac-
cordingly, he makes a reservation on the next available flight, which
leaves at 5:00 p.m., and packs his suitcase. He then heads down-
stairs to meet his friend for lunch at the hotel restaurant. After they
order, Sir Andrew takes the leaflet from his pocket and shows it to
his old friend. "Well Catherine, I trust your organization is fighting
this Vick guy tooth and nail."
"Actually, Andrew, we are not allowed to fight or support specific
candidates anymore. Allstate has a law that prohibits all corpora-
tions, and we are incorporated you know, from making any expendi-
ture in connection with a state or local election. We are allowed to
set up a segregated fund for that purpose, but that is costly and
difficult." '27
Sir Andrew drops his fork and says, "but you are a public interest
organization. Surely, groups like yours are allowed to support candi-
dates whose beliefs are consistent with the beliefs of your
members."
"Unfortunately not," Catherine replies. "About three months ago
the Supreme Court upheld the Allstate law on the grounds that the
special characteristics of the corporate structure allow the state to
regulate corporate speech even when it is political and even if the
corporation is politically oriented and not-for-profit.2 8 It is a terrible
decision but I am afraid we are stuck with it."
Sir Andrew tells Catherine he is sorry but not surprised after
what he has seen over the past three days. Sir Andrew then decides
to change the subject and he and Catherine enjoy a merry lunch
recounting fond memories of their days at Cambridge.
27. This Allstate law is substantially similar to the federal law that the Supreme Court invali-
dated in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986). Justice Rehn-
quist dissented. Id. at 266 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
28. See Citizens for a Safer Allstate v. Allstate, 688 U.S. 234 (1999) (relying on Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent in FEC, 479 U.S. at 266 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
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By the time lunch ends, it is almost 3:00 p.m. and Sir Andrew has
to take a taxi to the airport. As his plane takes off, Sir Andrew
reviews the events of the last three days. His trip began, of course,
because the Supreme Court decided that a person who burned the
American flag in political protest could be prosecuted under a flag
burning law, but a person who burned a cross directly in front of
several people of color could not be prosecuted under a law prohibit-
ing race-based fighting words. He then learned that state-owned air-
ports can constitutionally ban all leafletting; that the states can tax
large newspapers differently than small newspapers; that states can
ban political protests outside foreign embassies; that the public and
the press have no right to attend trials of great public interest; that
the states can finance religious schools and sponsor prayer in the
public schools; that the states can mandate that their drivers carry
political messages on their license plates; that the states can prohibit
nude dancing in bars while allowing it in the local community thea-
ter; that the states can regulate charities out of existence; that the
states can condition their financial grants to the arts on the grantee
agreeing not to express certain viewpoints; and that states can se-
verely impede the political speech of political organizations. After
reviewing his journal, Sir Andrew closes his eyes and drifts off into
a deep sleep where he has a nightmare about the Chief Justice of
the United States Supreme Court presiding on the bench wearing
nothing but a larger than life American flag.
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